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Abstract:
The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in
a labour relationship is not well understood. We address these implications theoretically and
experimentally. In our baseline experiments, the employer offers a wage to the worker who
may then accept or reject it. In the public and private treatment, workers, moving first, make a
non-binding private or public wage proposal. Our theoretical model assumes that wage
proposals convey information about a worker’s minimum acceptable wage and are misreported
with a certain probability. It predicts that, on average, wage proposals lead to higher wage
offers and acceptance rates, with the highest wages under private proposals. While both, public
and private, proposals increase efficiency over the baseline, private proposals generate higher
worker incomes. Broad support for the theoretical predictions is found in the laboratory
experiments. Our work has important implications for recent policies promoting public
information on wage negotiations. We find that while wage proposals promote higher wages,
efficiency, and income equality, public information on wage negotiations is likely to benefit
firms more than workers.
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1. Introduction
Albeit cheap talk, employers frequently ask workers for their expected wages in negotiations.
The practice is common in professional sports, senior level management, academic hiring and
many other highly skilled jobs. Proposals can take many forms with one-to-one negotiations to
centralized mechanisms such as unions (at the firm, industry or national level) making wage
proposals to employers. Despite their widespread use, these forms of wage institutions have
been largely ignored.2
In this paper, we study pre-play communication in a laboratory experiment of
employment relationships where workers can make a non-binding wage proposal to their
employer. Our baseline follows the design of Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006) which looks at
the traditional ex-ante wage posting structure (ultimatum game) where the employer makes
wage offers to two workers. The worker can either accept or reject. On acceptance full surplus
is realised, while zero surplus is obtained in the case of a rejection. We then modify this setting
to allow for workers to first make private wage proposals that are non-binding for the firm.
Firms observe the proposals and can then choose to make an offer that the worker may accept
or reject.3 In the final treatment, we allow for public observability of past proposals for each
worker pair at the end of each period4. We focus on the effect that different wage proposals
have on the outcomes of the employment relationship. By comparing the effects of proposals
with the baseline, we can study how pre-play communication affects wages, income
distribution and overall efficiency. Our setting allows us to answer novel and interesting
research questions: Are wage offers higher when workers are allowed to make ex-ante
proposals? Do proposals increase the probability of accepting wage offers (and hence
efficiency)? Who benefits from making wage proposals public information to other workers?
To provide testable hypotheses for our experiment, we develop a theoretical framework
that relies on the idea that workers’ wage proposals are pre-play cheap talk (see Farrell and
Rabin 1996 for a review). In our model, non-binding proposals may convey information about
the worker’s minimum acceptable wage with workers misreporting their private information
with a certain positive probability. As a result, the optimal wage offer by the firm is a function
of the workers’ wage proposals (which may be “partially” or “fully” revealing to the employer).
2

See, Caju, Gautier, Momferatou and Ward-Warmedinger (2008) for details on different forms of wage bargaining institutions.
This is the ultimatum game version of the labor market institution where rejection of an offer results in zero surplus to both
workers and the firm. In fact, most traditional markets are of this nature, where a rejection of an offer from one side results in
zero surplus for both. A structure with counter proposals would be akin to a double auction or a bargaining framework.
4 Our private and public proposals treatments resemble the design in Rigdon (2012) (demand side) ultimatum game
experiment. Rigdon’s research goal is to analyse the gender wage gap under private proposals and whether it can be
mitigated with public information. Therefore, our focus is quite different from hers.
3
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We show that if we have a mix of “revealing” and “partially revealing” workers then the final
wage offer will be increasing in the proposals as the firm faces a trade-off between the
possibility of rejection of low offers and acceptance of higher ones. This simple intuition also
sets the stage for our main theoretical hypothesis. First, we expect firm’s wage offers to be
increasing in proposals. This implies that average wage offers under proposals should be
greater than in the baseline (with no proposals). We also expect wage proposals to increase
acceptance rates (and hence efficiency) relative to the baseline. Finally, due to conformity,
public proposals make workers more likely to accept lower wages and hence, relative to private
proposals, public proposals generate not only lower wages but also higher firm profits and a
more equal income distribution.
Our experimental results are broadly consistent with our theoretical predictions.
Overall, they indicate that introducing proposals prior to firm wage-setting decisions has
important efficiency and distributional consequences. While wage proposals always increase
efficiency, workers (firms) benefit more when proposals are private (public).5 Though not a
direct test, our experimental results have implications for policy makers as we find the potential
efficiency and distributional consequences of proposals that are a widely used instrument in
wage negotiations. In our experimental setup public proposals benefit the firm that earns higher
profits, while private proposals are more conducive towards improving workers’ wages.
Moreover, both type of wage proposals increase income equality among workers. On the other
hand, we also find that the baseline without proposals is the most inefficient setting while also
leading to the highest levels of income inequality. In a nutshell, our results indicate that while
both types of wage proposals lead to higher wages, income equality and efficiency, public
information benefits firms more than workers. While this finding runs counter to popular
opinion on the effects of wage transparency, it is very much in line with recent field evidence
showing that making the outcomes of wage negotiations public reduces individual workers’
bargaining power and hence wages (Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson, 2021). We suggest that a
possible explanation for this is that, under public information, workers are more willing to
conform to the proposals of others and less likely to reject wage offers.
5

While not our main focus, we also look at gender effects in our experiment (see Section 5.3). Wage proposals could be
another avenue for gender wage discrimination if females have lower willingness to accept/propose. We find that making
proposals privately (publicly), tend to increase male (female) wage proposals and hence overall income. Even though these
differences are not statistically significant, this pattern of behavior resembles the “catch up” result in Rigdon (2012).

3

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in Section
2. We describe the experimental design and procedures in Section 3. We present our theoretical
model in Section 4. The main results are reported in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6.

2. Literature Review
The only paper that analyses (average) wage proposals, in a relationship between firms and
workers is Bottino, García-Muñoz, Goddio and Kujal (2016). They studied the effect of worker
entitlement to a wage on a gift exchange game. Their structure resembles that of a workers’
union making a non-binding single wage proposal to firms on behalf of a worker’s collective.
An average non-binding wage proposal is presented to employers from the workers, who then
independently respond by making wage offers in a double auction format (a la Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993). While average wages slightly increase, they find a negative
relation between effort and wage expectations. The main difference with our study is that we
present worker proposals to firms at an individual level. Additionally, we don´t consider effort
levels to control for reciprocity effects. Also, they use a double auction set-up that as used in
gift exchange experiments. We model a firm-worker relationship where offers are posted and
can be only accepted or rejected.
Another paper that also uses proposals in a (Demand Side) Ultimatum game to study
the gender wage gap is Rigdon (2012). She finds that females ask for less and earn smaller
amounts than their male counterparts. In her framework workers make proposals that are made
public in a subsequent treatment. Making proposals public, i.e. proposals being made by others
in a similar negotiating situation, directly influences the beliefs women have about proposals
in the ultimatum game. Consequently, they ask for more, thus eliminating the negotiation gap
and eliminating the gender gap in wages. In contrast to our study, Rigdon does not study a
labour market interaction and uses a Demand Side Ultimatum Game. Additionally, the
experiment does not consider a baseline treatment without proposals (since her research goal
is quite different to ours) and her framework cannot be used to assess the overall effects of
wage proposals.6

6

Yamamori et al. (2008) conducted a dictator game experiment in which the recipient states a request for the minimum offer
that they are willing to receive before the dictator dictates their offer, finding that the latter increases as the recipient’s request
increases to half of the share. Albeit in a quite different setting, their finding is in line with our own result that wage offers
tend to increase with workers’ proposals.
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Besides the abovementioned papers there is an experimental literature on negotiation
related with our study. Their focus, however, is on the gender gap. Some of them consider the
Ultimatum Game (Eckel and Grossman, 2001 and García-Gallego, Georgantzís and JaramilloGutiérrez, 2012), while others use different versions of negotiation games with several stages
(Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri, 2018 and Exley, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2020). We will
provide further details of these studies in the results section where we report our findings on
gender.
Cheap talk can be interpreted as the weakest form of worker participation where firms
consider credible workers’ communication with a certain probability. Therefore, our research
also adds to the literature on worker involvement in the wage participation process (Charness,
et al. 2012, Charness et al. 2016, Jeworrek and Mertins, 2014, Franke, Gurtoviy and Mertins,
2016, among others). Worker participation in the wage determination process occurs in many
forms in the workplace. It can be through wage bargaining, centralised or decentralised, or
direct participation of workers in the wage process. The latter has been studied in the lab
(Charness et al. 2012) and the field (Jeworrek and Mertins, 2014). Other factors that have been
studied are social comparison (Charness et al. 2016) or choosing from a menu of options
(Franke, Gurtoviy and Mertins, 2016). The majority of this research, experimental or field,
broadly confirms that worker participation increases worker productivity.
Charness et al. (2016) argue that social comparison is important in labour markets and
may affect one’s attitude towards an employer or intrinsic motivation. This is similar to our
idea of conformity (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), when rival proposals are public, where
workers observe proposals of a worker from an earlier period. The only channel through which
conformity works in our setup is through adjustment of wage proposals. Our idea of conformity
assumes that a worker’s proposal will mimic the co-worker’s previous proposal (Charness et
al. 2016).
A comment is due as to whether the behavioral traits identified in the experiment are
present or applicable in markets outside the laboratory. While external validity is always an
issue in any laboratory (or field) experiment, what is important is that qualitative results guide
us in the right direction (see Kessler and Vesterlund, 2015 and Camerer, 2015). There is
evidence that many of the behavioural traits observed in the laboratory are observed with high
stakes (Cameron, 1999; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougareva, 2002:
Jeworrek and Mertins, 2014) or extend to real world situations. Jeworrek and Mertins (2014)
find that a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages, as had been
suggested by laboratory evidence, extends to the field. They find that this policy indeed
5

enhances performance. Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007) compare an Ultimatum Game (UG
hereafter) where participants were students and another UG where participants were
newspaper’s readers and they found that results are similar, so there is a high degree of students
population data validity. Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) find that professionals also are subject
to the winner’s curse. Fairness concerns also play a prominent role in firm’s wage policies
(Bewley and Bewley, 2009; Agell and Bennmarker, 2003) while, recent papers indicate that
laboratory measures of social preferences can be good predictors of behavior in field settings.
Karlan (2005) shows that reciprocity (i.e., trustworthiness) in trust games predicts subjects’
loan repayments one year after a laboratory experiment, and Carpenter and Seki’s work (2005)
suggests that laboratory measures of conditional cooperation forecast productivity in the
workplace. Finally, laboratory experiments have long been used by policy makers as a guide,
i.e. to provide qualitative insights. The Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) used
laboratory experiments to gain insights into incentive regulation (see Cox and Isaac, 1986 and
Rassenti and Smith, 1986). Laboratory experiments were then further used as a guide to inform
electric decentralization/privatization in US, Australia and New Zealand (Rassenti, Smith and
Wilson, 2002). Therefore, while we do not wish to downplay the importance of field evidence
on salary negotiations, we also believe that laboratory experiment can be seen as a promising
first step to shed light on real world issues.

3. Experimental design
The experiment was conducted at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville (Spain) using zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007). It consisted of 12 sessions (four per treatment) with 219
participants in total, who were recruited online using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). No one was
allowed to participate in more than one session. The average length of a session was around 70
minutes and average earnings were 10.95€.
Our design is a slightly modified version of the game in Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006).
Participants were randomly assigned a role as either a firm or a worker and the role was fixed
for the entire duration of the experiment. In each period, a firm was randomly matched with
two workers. Subjects read the instructions once roles were assigned to participants.7 To make
sure they understood the instructions, all participants had to answer some questions after

7

The instructions were first read individually and then aloud by the experimenter.
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finishing the instructions (see Appendix A2 for further details). They could only participate in
the experiment on successfully answering all questions. The experiment lasted 15 periods.
The basic structure, common to all treatments, was as follows. In the first stage, the firm
decided whether to make a wage offer to each worker or not.8,9 In the second stage, workers
receiving an offer decided whether to accept it or reject it. The surplus was only realized when
a contract was mutually agreed upon between a worker and a firm. A rejected offer implied
that neither the firm nor the worker realized any gains. To avoid potential confounding
regarding reciprocity concerns, workers were homogenous and did not differ in their
productivity levels. We considered three different experimental treatments:

Baseline (BASE): A firm could make a wage offer, or not, to one or both the workers.
A worker receiving an offer decides whether to accept it or reject it. Worker information was
private, and they only knew if they received an offer or not. They could also see their past
offers. Similarly, a firm could observe the entire history of her own past actions and earnings.

Private proposals (PRIV): Prior to Stage 1 of the BASE, workers first made a private
“wage proposal” to the firm. Firms knew that the proposals were not binding, and they could
make an alternate (or no) wage offer.
Public proposals (PUB): The only difference with PRIV is that workers could see the
co-workers’ past proposals at the end of each period.

Treatment

Table 1: Experimental design
Description
Time Line
Firms could make 0/1/2
private wage offers in

Stage 1

Stage 2

8

Following Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2006), we frame the instructions as employer, employee and wages (see instructions in
Appendix A1).
9 The firm-worker framing is also used in García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012).
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Baseline
(BASE)

Stage-1. Workers accepted
or rejected the offers.
They own past offers. Firms
saw own past actions and
worker decisions.

Private
Proposals
(PRIV)

Workers made non-binding
“wage proposals” to the
firms before the wage offer
+ BASE

PRIV + workers could see
all the other workers’ past
proposals.

Public
Proposals
(PUB)

Firm:
Wage offer

Stage 1

Worker:
Accepts/Rejects

Stage 2

Stage 3

Firm:
Worker:
Worker:
Wage proposal Wage offer Accepts/Rejects

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Firm:
Worker:
Worker:
Wage proposal Wage offer Accepts/Rejects

Worker:
proposal
revealed
Note: There were 4 sessions per treatment, 25 firms and 50 workers in BASE, 24 firms and 48 workers in both
PRIV and PUB.

If an offer was accepted, the worker received the agreed wage and the firm earned 390
points (see exchange rates below) minus the wage offer. Earnings for firms and workers are
summarized in Table 2, where 𝑤𝑖 denotes the wage offer for the worker, 𝑖 = {1, 2}.
Table 2: Payoffs
Total offers

Total surplus

Worker

Firm Profits

decision
0

0

1

390

2

780

Worker
earnings

-

0

0

Accept

390-wi, i=1,2

wi, i=1,2

Reject

0

0

Accept

780-(w1+w2)

wi, i=1,2

Reject

0

0

At the end of the experiment, participants answered a questionnaire that included age,
gender, zip code, studies, self-reported fair wage, reasons for wage discrimination (only for
firms), Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014), risk aversion (Bomb
Risk Elicitation Task by Crosetto and Filippin, 2013) and the difficulty to recognize own
mistakes (for further details on these questions see Appendix A3). The answers to this
questionnaire allows us to control for subject heterogeneity.

8

The payoff functions, the number of rounds and the matching protocol were common
information for participants in all treatments. Everyone was informed that they will be paid for
one out of the 15 rounds randomly chosen, but they were only informed about their own
exchange rate at the start of the experiment.10 Exchange rates were set to have comparable
payoffs across participants. The exchange rate for firms was 1 euro = 17.73 points and 1 euro
= 21.67 points for workers.
In all treatments, firms could only see their own wage offers and payoffs for current
and previous periods at the end of each period. Additionally, under PRIV firms were also
informed about wage proposals in the current and all previous periods, while workers were
also informed about their own wage proposals after period one. Finally, in PUB workers were
informed about the history of the other co-worker’s wage proposals from all past periods for
that match.

4. The theoretical model
In this section, we describe a theoretical framework that formalizes the key elements of our
experiment. This is done to obtain testable hypothesis regarding overall treatment differences.
Below we describe the basic model and discuss the experimental hypotheses.
We consider an ultimatum game between a “worker” (he) and a “firm” (she). Let 𝑀 ∈ ℝ+
be the endowment to be divided between the two parties. In our basic framework, the firm
offers a wage to the worker, 𝑤𝑜 ≤ 𝑀, which in turn decides whether to accept or reject. If the
firm’s offer is accepted, the worker receives 𝑤𝑜 and the firm collects 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑜 . If the offer is
rejected, both parties end up with 0. For simplicity, we assume risk neutrality which involves
linear utility functions over wealth (i.e., 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑜 for the firm and 𝑤𝑜 for the worker).11
Consistent with results in ultimatum games (see Camerer, 2011, pp.48-63 for a review) we
assume that the worker has a minimum acceptable wage 𝑤𝑚 ≤ 𝑀.12 Thus, the worker will
accept (reject) a firm’s offer if 𝑤𝑜 ≥ 𝑤𝑚 (𝑤𝑜 < 𝑤𝑚 ). The worker’s minimum acceptable wage
can be of two types, low and high, indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} where 𝑀 ≥ 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 > 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ≥ 0. We
10

By informing subjects of their exchange rate at the start of the experiment, we are more likely to prevent feelings of
disappointment and increase their willingness to participate in future experiments (Blount and Bazerman, 1996).
11 None of the main predictions that we test in our experiment would change if we assumed risk aversion. Only the quantitative
results might be different. It is easy to check that the wage offer should increase with the firm’s level of risk aversion.
12 Note that the existence of a minimum acceptable wage is also consistent with previous papers on rules of fairness in the
workplace (e.g., Akerlof, 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986; Bottino, García-Muñoz, Goddio and Kujal, 2016).
According to this interpretation 𝑤𝑚 represents the worker’s ‘reference wage’, that is, his idiosyncratic idea of a fair
compensation.
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denote by 𝑞 the proportion of workers with a low minimum acceptable wage (𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) in the
population.13

3.1. Baseline (BASE)
We begin by solving the model where the firm does not have any more information about the
worker’s type other than the commonly known prior (𝑞). This corresponds to our Baseline
(BASE) treatment. In this case, the firm decides whether to offer a high wage (𝑤𝑜 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 )
that both worker types would accept or, offer a low wage (𝑤𝑜 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) that will be accepted
only with probability 𝑝. We denote by 𝑇 =

𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿

the firm’s profits from a high offer relative

to the firm’s profits from a low offer that was accepted. Therefore, 𝑇 < 1 is a measure of the
relative profitability of making a high wage offer. In the proposition below we provide the
optimal wage (𝑤0𝐵𝐴𝑆 ) and the corresponding expected firm’s profits (Π𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆 ), expected worker’s
𝐵𝐴𝑆
income (Π𝑊
) and the acceptance rate (𝑟 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 ). All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.

Proposition 1 (BASE): The optimal wage offered by the firm, and the corresponding expected
firm’s profits, expected worker’s income and the acceptance rate are given by:
𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
𝑞(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 )
𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
; 𝛱𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 < 𝑇
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝛱𝑊
={

where 𝑇 =

𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿

𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿
𝑤𝑚,𝐻

𝑖𝑓 𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
𝑖𝑓 𝑞 < 𝑇

𝑖𝑓 𝑞 ≥ 𝑇 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑞 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
; 𝑟
={
𝑖𝑓 𝑞 < 𝑇
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 < 𝑇

.

Thus, the firm makes a low offer when the proportion of low types in the population is
high enough (𝑞 is high) and/or when making a high offer is relatively unprofitable (𝑇 is low),
otherwise the firm makes a high offer. The low offer would be accepted only with probability
𝑞, while a high offer would be accepted by all workers.

3.2. Private Proposals (PRIV)

13

In a previous version we proposed a general version of this model where the minimum acceptable wage follows a uniform
continuous distribution (the document is available upon request). Our main qualitative results and predictions were not affected
by this assumption. We thus focus on the two-type model for the sake of simplicity and clarity of exposition.
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We now consider a modified version of the ultimatum game in which the worker moves first
by sending a non-binding wage proposal to the firm, 𝑤𝑝 ≤ 𝑀 . After receiving the wage
proposal, the firm decides the wage offer. The worker can then accept or reject the firm’s offer.
Below is the timeline for this game.
Following insights from the cheap talk literature (see Farrell and Rabin 1996 for a
review) we study a situation where the wage proposal conveys information about the worker’s
minimum acceptable wage (𝑤𝑚,𝑖 ), with the possibility that the worker might be misreporting
their private information. In particular, we assume that the low type worker’s proposal is their
minimum acceptable wage (i.e., reports truthfully) with probability 𝜆 ∈ (0,1).14 However, with
probability 1 − 𝜆 the low type proposes 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 (i.e., she misreports).15 Therefore, when
observing a high wage proposal the firm does not know whether the worker is truly a high type,
or a low type who is misreporting. The assumption that the worker, when proposing a wage to
the firm, does not always misreport his minimum acceptable wage is consistent with the
“aversion to lying” literature (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al. 2009). Moreover, for
simplicity, we do not formalize whether it is optimal for the low type worker to misreport or
not, and simply assume that this occurs with a commonly known probability (1 − 𝜆).
Note that, in our model, low proposals 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (which arise with probability 𝜆𝑞) are
“fully revealing” for the firm, because only a low type who is truthfully reporting would make
such a low proposal. However, observing 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 is only “partially revealing” because
such a proposal might have come from a high type (with probability (1 − 𝑞)) or from a low
type who is misreporting (with probability 𝑞(1 − 𝜆)). It is easy to see that the firm would
always meet the worker’s proposal when it is “fully revealing”. If, however, the wage proposal
is “partially revealing” then the firm needs to consider the trade-off between the benefit of
offering 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 if the worker is misreporting, and the loss that comes from a rejection if the
worker’s proposal was his minimum acceptable wage, 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 . In other words, the firm decides

According to Farrell and Rabin (1996): “[P]eople typically say what they want to have been believed even when the
incentives clearly imply that cheap talk should not be believed, [that is] some people tell the truth despite incentives to lie”
(p.104). However, that some people always propose their minimum acceptable wage is not key assumption in our model. Our
main results would remain unchanged if we assume that everybody misreports, as long as some misreport more than others.
15 In the continuous version of this model (available upon request) workers can misreport by a factor 𝑏 > 0. The two-type
model is essentially a particular case of the continuous model where 𝑏 =𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 . The assumption that only the low type
misreports is also captured in the continuous version because, given that the maximum report is 𝑀, those with a high minimum
acceptable wage (𝑤𝑚 > 𝑀 − 𝑏) cannot fully misreport; and those with 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑀 will not misreport at all. Therefore, a high
proposal in the continuous case is more indicative that the worker is not misreporting. Finally, note that in the discrete model,
results would not be different if we allow the high type to misreport as well; this is because such a misreport will always be
detected, and hence ignored, by the firm.
14
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whether it pays off to believe the worker or not. In the following proposition we summarize
the results of the private proposals case.

Proposition 2 (PRIV): The optimal wage policy and the corresponding expected firm profits,
expected worker income and the acceptance rate are given by:
𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = {

𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿
𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉
where
𝑤
̃
=
{
;
𝑜
𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇

𝛱𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉
𝛱𝑊

where =

𝑞(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 )
𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇
={
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇

𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿
𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉
𝑞 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑇
={
;
𝑟
=
{
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑇

𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿

, 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = 𝑃(𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) =

(1−𝜆)𝑞
1−𝑞𝜆

< 𝑞, and 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 is the optimal

wage offer conditional on the wage proposal being high.

When a worker first makes a proposal, he is sending a signal to the firm about his
𝐻
minimum acceptable wage. While proposing 𝑤𝑚
is only partially revealing, it decreases the

firm’s belief that the worker is low type (i.e., 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 < 𝑞). As a result, when the proposal is
high, the firm is less likely to offer a low wage offer in PRIV than in BASE. Consequently,
expected worker’s income should increase with proposals. However, as we show in the
corollary below, because acceptance rates will be higher, firms’ might also be strictly better
off under proposals.
Corollary 1 (PRIV vs. BASE): Comparing the results when private proposals are available
(PRIV) with the results without proposals (BASE), we find that:
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉
𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 ; 𝛱𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝛱𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 ; 𝛱𝑊
≥ 𝛱𝑊
and 𝑟 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ 𝑟 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸

3.3. Public Proposals (PUB)
We now proceed to discuss an extension of the previous model where workers are informed
about a co-worker’s previous wage proposal. We assume that after a first period with private
proposals, there is a second period where the worker learns about the proposal made by the coworker in the previous period16. The extension allows us to consider the possibility that workers

16

This structure resembles the PUB treatment in our experiment.
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change their proposal to conform to others’. Social psychologists refer to conformity as “the
act of changing one’s behavior to match the responses of others” (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004,
p. 606). Conformity is not only widespread, but also at the root of important findings in the
economic literature (see, e.g., Bernheim, 1994; Clark and Oswald, 1998; Sliwka, 2007; Thöni
and Gächter, 2015).17
We capture conformity in our model by assuming that a worker’s proposal in PUB will
mimic the co-worker’s previous proposal. Therefore, instead of being purely random, the low
type worker’s decision to misreport in PUB is affected by the co-workers’ previous proposal.
However, although a low type (i.e., 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ), observes a high proposal by his co-worker, this
worker will keep his type fixed. Moreover, our notion of conformity also implies that when a
worker, who was initially of the high type (i.e., 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ), is informed of a low proposal, i.e.
𝑤𝑝,𝑐 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 , the worker will then also make a similar low wage proposal (𝑤𝑝𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ).
This, in effect, makes the worker a low type because, in our model, he cannot reject an offer
that meets his proposal. 18 Thus, although both types of workers mimic their co-workers
proposals, only high types indeed change their type (to low).
In the following figure, we show that the worker’s proposal, given his initial minimum
acceptable wage (and type), has a low minimum acceptable wage in PUB and all possible
subsequent matches. From Figure 3 we can compute the total probability of the worker being
𝑃𝑈𝐵
of low type in PUB: 𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≔ 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) = 𝑞(1 + (1 − 𝑞)𝜆) > 𝑞 . Therefore, our

notion of conformity implies that there will be more low type workers in PUB than in PRIV,
which is a key driver of the results in this section. In the following proposition we summarize
the results for the public proposal case.

Conformity is a type of “social influence”: the fact that a person’s emotions, opinions or behaviors are affected by others.
There are two types of conformity, “normative influence” is often used to refer to situations in which individuals are susceptible
to social influence in order to conform to or identify with others (Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1950; Asch, 1953; Cai, Chen
and Fang, 2009; and Fatas, Heap and Arjona, 2018). Alternatively, “informational influence” (also known as “social proof”)
is used to describe social influence in a context in which the behavior of others is useful in order to infer inaccessible
information about an objective state of the world (Banerjee 1992; Anderson and Holt, 1997; Goeree and Yariv, 2015; and
Muchnik, Aral and Taylor, 2013). In this paper, we are agnostic about what type of conformism is more likely to affect
subjects’ behaviour (but they are not mutually exclusive). Thus, our assumption is that people conform but we do not enter
into the reasons why people conform.
18 Note that, for simplicity, we are assuming that neither firms nor workers are forward looking and hence the results in PRIV
are unaffected by adding a new interaction in PUB.
17
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Figure 3. Worker’s proposal (and type) in PUB given own and co-worker’s previous proposal.
Proposition 3 (PUB). The optimal wage policy and the corresponding expected firm’s profits,
expected worker’s income and acceptance rates are given by:
𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿
𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 = { 𝑃𝑈𝐵
where 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
;
𝑤
̃𝑜
𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇

Π𝐹𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {

𝑃𝑈𝐵
Π𝑊
={

where 𝑇 =

𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 )

𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇

𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 𝑤𝑚,𝐿

𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇

𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵

𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐻
𝑀−𝑤𝑚,𝐿

𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇

𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
; 𝑟 𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {
1
𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇
<𝑇

𝑃𝑈𝐵
𝑃𝑈𝐵
, 𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) = 𝑞(1 + (1 − 𝑞)𝜆) > 𝑞 , 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑃(𝑤𝑚
=

𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) =

1−𝜆𝑞
1−𝜆𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑈𝐵

> 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 , and 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 is the optimal wage offer conditional on

the wage proposal being high.
We can use Propositions 1-3 to compare results across our three treatments. In the next
corollary, we focus on the most interesting case in which the firm finds it optimal to
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discriminate between proposals in PRIV; while the wage offer in PUB and BASE can be
rejected.
Corollary 2 (PUB vs. PRIV vs. BASE). If 𝑇 ∈ (𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 , 𝑞] then:
𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 > 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 = 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 ;
In this case, we have,
Π𝐹𝑃𝑈𝐵 > Π𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 ≥ Π𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑃𝑈𝐵
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉
Π𝑊
> Π𝑊
> Π𝑊

𝑟 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 = 1 > 𝑟 𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑟 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
Therefore, under the conditions of Corollary 2 we obtain a clear ranking of outcomes
in the three cases (BASE, PRIV and PUB). First, for firms, we expect the highest profits in
PUB and the lowest profits in BASE with PRIV in the middle. As we showed in Section 3.2,
worker proposals can promote higher wages, profits, and overall efficiency when they provide
information about the worker’s type. In addition, as we have shown in this section, there will
be a higher proportion of workers with low minimum acceptable wages in the population
(𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞) when proposals are made public, which are the type of workers most profitable for
the firm. Because of the same reason, we also expect higher worker incomes (i.e., accepted
wages) under private proposals. Finally, the condition of Corollary 2 ensures that while every
worker would accept the firm offer under private proposals, high type workers would reject it
in PUB and in BASE. However, since there are less high type workers in PUB, the acceptance
rate will be higher than in BASE.
Corollary 3 (Income inequality across treatments). If 𝑇 ∈ (𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉 , 𝑞] then,
(i)

Conditional on the wage offer being accepted, income inequality among workers is
higher in PRIV than in PUB and BASE.

(ii)

Worker’s income, as a share of the total surplus, is higher in PRIV than in PUB and
BASE.

Corollary 3 follows from the result that the firm offers higher wages to those who ask for
it only under private proposals. While workers receive low wage offers regardless of their
proposals in PUB or BASE (see Corollary 2). It follows then than under private proposals, the
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percentege of accepted high wages should be higher (Corollary 3.1) and worker’s should be
able to get a higher share of the total surplus (Corollary 3.2) than in the other two conditions.
3.4. Testable Predictions
In this section, we provide testable predictions for our experiments. In our theory, wage
proposals convey (imperfect) information about the worker’s minimum acceptable wage;
therefore, firms would, on average, offer higher wages to those making higher proposals. Our
results also indicate that, because workers can misreport, the firm’s optimal policy is
sometimes to ignore high proposals and offer a low wage instead.
Hypothesis 1: (wage offers and proposals)
(i)

We expect firms’ wage-offers to increase in the workers’ proposals.

(ii)

We expect average wage proposals to be higher than average wage-offers.

(iii)

We expect average wage-offers to be higher under proposals.

Our notion of conformity (see Figure 3) implies that the probability that a low-type worker
reports their minimum acceptable wage is 𝜆𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑞(𝜆𝑞) + (1 − 𝑞)(𝜆𝑞) < 𝜆. Therefore, we
expect more misreporting in PUB than in PRIV. On the other hand, our notion of conformity
also implies that there will be more low type workers under public proposals and hence workers
will be more likely to accept lower wages in PUB than in PRIV and, as we showed in Corollary
2, this will promote firms to offer lower wages in PUB than in PRIV.
Hypothesis 2: (Conformity)
(i)

We expect similar wage proposals in PUB and PRIV.

(ii)

We expect higher accepted wages in PRIV than in PUB.

(iii)

We expect higher wage offers in PRIV than in PUB.

Under the condition of Corollary 2 we can also make some predictions about how proposals
affect firm’s profits, worker’s income and acceptance rates (and hence overall efficiency).
Hypothesis 3: (Welfare effects)
(i)

We expect workers’ income to have the following ranking: PRIV > PUB > BASE.

(ii)

We expect firms’ profits to have the following ranking: PUB > PRIV > BASE.
16

(iii)

We expect acceptance rates (and hence overall efficiency) to be higher under both
PRIV and PUB proposals than in BASE.

Finally, Corollary 3 also predicts results about income equality.
Hypothesis 4 (Income inequality)
(i)

We expect the share of workers in total surplus to have the following ranking: PRIV
> PUB and BASE.

(ii)

Conditional on the wage offer being accepted, income equality among workers is
higher in PUB and BASE than in PRIV.

5. Results
We use both nonparametric statistics and econometric analysis to test our hypotheses.
Nonparametric tests (Mann-Whitney one-tailed tests unless otherwise stated) are considered at
an individual level to ensure independence. Observations for each individual are averaged for
the 15 experimental rounds. To be more conservative with the independence hypothesis nonparametric tests are also conducted at the session level. The econometric analysis (while
controlling for additional effects) is conducted using both Random Effects (RE hereafter) Logit
and Generalized Least Squared (GLS hereafter) models. We first study wages and proposals
with their acceptance rates. This is followed by welfare effects and income equality. Finally,
though, we have a limited number of observations for firms, we also explore gender
differences.
5.1. Wages and proposals
Figure 2 shows firms’ (wage) offers and workers’ (wage) proposals over time for PRIV and
PUB. The relationship of those two variables is positive with correlation coefficient of 0.544
(p < 0.01) for PRIV and 0.452 (p < 0.01) for PUB. This confirms Hypothesis 1(i) that the wage
offers increase in the wage proposals. Proposals and wage offers, under both PRIV and PUB,
have a positive trend over time. Interestingly, as the experiment progresses, the gap between
workers’ proposals and firms’ wage offers is increasing under PUB and is greater than under
PRIV. This might be because firms learn over time that, as predicted by our theory, workers
are less likely to reject low wage offers in PUB than in PRIV. Note that there is no apparent
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difference between the proposals under PRIV and PUB, however, wage offers under PUB are
flatter. This is reflected in the lower correlation coefficient (0.452) between proposals and wage
offers under PUB.

Average wage proposed by firms
and workers

Figure 2: Average wage proposals and firms’ wage offers over time
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Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for wage offers and proposals. Differences
between proposals and wage offers are positive on average (75.92 for PRIV and 88.44 for
PUB). We cannot, however, consider that wage proposals and wage offers are independent.
Thus, we conduct a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and find that proposals are
statistically higher than wage offers in each period (PRIV: maximum p < 0.001; PUB:
maximum p < 0.001). This supports Hypothesis 1 (ii). In Figure 2 above, we can see that this
result holds in all 15 periods for both treatments. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 (iii), we see
that wage offers by firms are higher (see Table 3) when workers can submit wage proposals
(PRIV and PUB) compared to the baseline (PRIV-BASE: z = -3.001, p < 0.001; PUB-BASE:
z = -0.917, p = 0.017).
Next, we focus on the prediction that workers’ proposals are affected by a conformity effect in
PUB (Hypothesis 2). As predicted by Hypothesis 2 (i), wage proposals are very similar in PUB
and PRIV (235.43 vs. 234.66, p = 0.956, two-tailed test). Moreover, in line with Hypothesis 2
(ii), accepted wages in PUB (158.96) are lower than in PRIV (177.17) and this difference is
significant (p =0.003). In fact, our notion of conformity also implies that workers should
18

misreport more (i.e., propose more than they would accept) in PUB than in PRIV. We find
evidence in line with this effect as the difference between proposals and accepted wages is
higher in PUB (74.92) than in PRIV (55.38) (z = -4.159; p < 0.000). Importantly, firms seem
to be aware of this effect, because despite observing similar wage proposals, they offer lower
wages in PUB (152.77) than in PRIV (170.04); a result supporting Hypothesis 2 (iii) (p
=0.019).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for average wages and proposals
BASE

PRIV

PUB

75%

86%

87%

Wage offers by firms

144.79

170.04

152.77

Accepted wages by workers

160.42

177.17

158.96

Wage proposals by workers

-

235.43

234.66

Proposals – accepted wages

-

55.38

74.92

25/50

24/48

24/48

% Accepted offers

N(firms/workers)

Table 4 presents a series of RE Generalized Least Squares regressions where the
dependent variable is the average wage offer made by firms.19 The first explanatory variable,
given the strong relationship observed in Figure 2 above, is workers’ proposal, computed as
the average of the two proposals for the workers-firm pair in a given period. To control for
heterogeneity, as it is usual in laboratory experiments, we use some of the variables extracted
from our post-questionnaire (see experimental section): female, a dummy with value 1 if the
firm is female and 0 otherwise; risk lover, a categorical variable that is 0 if the firm is risk
averse, 1 if risk neutral and 2 if risk lover; self-reported fair wage, that is, firms’ subjective
opinion about what they considered to be a fair wage in a post-questionnaire; high income, a
dummy with value 1 if the subject is among the 25% of the subjects living in areas with higher
per capita income and 0 otherwise. We also consider the period to control for time trends and
the dummies for the BASE and the PRIV treatments.

19

Results qualitatively hold if the dependent variable is the wage offer made by firms to each worker.
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We test Hypothesis 1 in specifications 1 and 2. The coefficient associated with worker
proposals is positive and significant for both PRIV (0.412, p<0.01) and PUB (0.272, p<0.01).
Higher proposals result in higher wage offers and this is independent of whether the proposal
is private or public. It is worthwhile to note that the size of the effect under PRIV is much
higher than under PUB. This is line with our theoretical model where workers in PUB are
affected by conformity and hence, compared to PRIV, they are more likely to make proposals
similar to their co-workers. We check this effect by looking at the difference in proposals (for
the same firm) for PRIV and PUB. We find that, in line with our conjectures, the average
difference in proposals received by each firm in PUB (68.73) is significantly lower than in
PRIV (80.07) (-2.228, p < 0.013).
Table 4: RE GLS regressions on wage offers by firms

Worker proposals
Female
Risk lover
Self-reported fair
wage
High income
Period

PRIV
(1)

PUB
(2)

BASE vs PRIV
(3)

BASE vs PUB
(4)

PRIV vs PUB
(5)

0.412***
(0.055)
-1.844
(12.384)
-3.472
(6.308)
-0.044
(0.071)
17.059*
(9.314)
1.392**
(0.624)

0.272***
(0.044)
12.076
(10.996)
-10.004*
(5.298)
0.198***
(0.076)
-2.883
(9.851)
-0.336
(0.711)

-9.678
(10.440)
-4.273
(4.361)
0.151
(0.105)
11.270
(9.700)
1.691***
(0.579)
-21.540**
(10.29)
-21.642**
(10.289)

-7.688
(9.398)
-3.508
(4.172)
0.209**
(0.089)
6.187
(10.460)
0.715
(0.489)
-8.270
(9.070)
-8.27
(9.07)

0.323***
(0.035)
3.217
(8.383)
-6.198
(4.110)

BASE
PRIV
Constant
R-squared
Observations

66.686***
(19.73)
0.188
358

62.467**
(17.223)
0.314
359

129.500***
(20.64)
0.225
732

112.400***
(17.50)
0.221
733

6.633
(7.142)
0.582
(0.482)

12.38*
(6.593)
76.37***
(10.97)
0.176
717

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, we make pairwise comparisons between treatments. Specification (3) confirms
that wage offers were significantly higher in PRIV than in BASE. Although, wages were higher
in PUB, they were not significantly different between BASE and PUB (see dummy BASE in
specification (4) of Table 4). Our econometric analysis thus finds strong support for Hypothesis
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1(i), (ii) and partly for (iii) (though higher, average wage offers under PUB are not significantly
different than BASE). We state Result 1 below based on Hypothesis 1:
Result 1.
i)

Firms’ wage-offers increase with workers’ wage-proposals.

ii)

On average, wage-proposals are higher than wage offers.

iii)

Compared to BASE, wage-offers are higher in PRIV and PUB, but only the former
difference is statistically significant.

Finally, in specification (5) of Table 4, we confirm that Hypothesis 2 (iii) still holds when
we control for other effects (see coefficient 12.38 of the PRIV dummy). We summarize our
results for Hypothesis 2 as follows:

Result 2.
i)

Wage proposals are similar in PRIV and PUB.

ii)

Accepted wages are higher in PRIV than in PUB.

iii)

Wage-offers are higher in PRIV than in PUB.

5.2. Profits, Efficiency and Income Inequality
In Table 5, we report descriptive statistics for firm and worker earnings, and income inequality.
Relative to the baseline, workers’ earnings are higher under both, PRIV and PUB, proposals
(PRIV-BASE: z = -4.864, p < 0.001; PUB-BASE: z = -2.615, p = 0.004). Moreover, workers
earn slightly more under PRIV than under PUB (PRIV-PUB: z = 1.568, p = 0.059). This
supports Hypothesis 3 (i). Interestingly, relative to the baseline, firm profits are higher for
public and private proposals. The difference, however, is only significant for PUB (z = -2.680,
p = 0.004) and not for PRIV (z = -0.160, p = 0.873, two-tails). Moreover, the highest profits
for firms are attained when proposal are public (PRIV-PUB: z = -3.103; p = 0.001). Thus, in
line with Hypothesis 3 (ii) PUB is the most favourable treatment for firms.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for profits, efficiency and income inequality
21

BASE

PRIV

PUB

Firms’ earnings

334.90

347.63

390.12

Workers’ earnings

116.14

144.69

134.45

Total earnings

568.88

635.69

658.67

Acceptance rates

75%

86%

87%

Workers’ surplus
share
Gini Index: Overall

20%

22%

20%

0.450

0.318

0.364

Gini Index: workers
N(firms/workers)

0.172
25/50

0.157
24/48

0.164
24/48

Efficiency is only impacted in our framework if a contract between a worker and firm
is not realized. This can occur if a worker rejects a wage offer or if a firm makes no wage offer
to a worker. In both cases, workers and firms would get zero earnings, resulting in a deadweight
loss and lower total surplus (efficiency). We find that acceptance rates are higher (by
approximately 10%) both under PRIV and PUB (PRIV-BASE: z =-2.566, p = 0.005; PUBBASE: z = -3.186, p < 0.001). This result is consistent with our theoretical framework
(Hypothesis 3(iii)) where proposals lead not only to higher wage offers (Hypothesis 1(iii)) but
also, in the case of PUB, to a higher chance that the worker would accept a low offer (i.e., of
being a “low type”). Finally, overall efficiency does not appear to be different in PUB or PRIV
(PRIV-PUB: z = 1.043, p = 0.297, two-tailed test)20.
We next test Hypothesis 4 by looking at the impact of proposals on income inequality.
First, we observe that although efficiency is higher and wages increase when proposals are
present, workers’ share in total surplus declines when proposals are public (vs private) (p =
0.024). In fact, and due to the lower proportion of low types in PUB, workers’ share in BASE
and PUB are not statistically different (p = 0.223, two-tails). These results support Hypothesis
4 (i). Next, we consider two additional measures of inequality for all our treatments: overall
inequality in the system (i.e., Gini index-overall), which measures how unequal are overall

20

These results are confirmed by the analogous tests at a session level (PRIV-BASE: p = 0.011, PUB-BASE: p = 0.011; PUBPRIV: p = 0.309, two-tails).
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outcomes for both workers and firms, and inequality across workers (Gini index-workers).21
Thus, the first measure captures inequality between firms and workers, while the second
measure focuses on inequality only across workers. Moreover, to be consistent with our
Hypothesis 4 (ii), we will compute the Gini index only for accepted offers22.
We obtain the highest (overall) income inequality in BASE (0.450) relative to PRIV
(0.318) and PUB (0.364) (see Gini index-overall variable on Table 5). This result is even more
striking given that our workers are homogenous, and labor is the only input. We expect these
results to be stronger if we include heterogeneity in skill or productivity levels of workers. Our
first take from this is that allowing for proposals decreases overall inequality, while, making
them public increases it slightly. Regarding income inequality only among workers, we observe
a slightly different result. We find that the Gini index-worker is the lower in PRIV (0.157) than
PUB (0.164) and BASE (0.172). Thus, making proposals decreases income inequality among
workers. These results are only partially consistent with Hypothesis 4 (ii). While our results
support the theoretical prediction that making proposals public create a more equal distribution
of wages relative to BASE, they are inconsistent with our prediction that PRIV should be the
most unequal treatment. Instead, our results show that BASE is the most unequal treatment.
One possible explanation for this is that, in contrast to our simplifying assumption of
commonly known priors in BASE, firms in our experiments might have had very different preconceived ideas about the workers’ minimum acceptable wage. If that is the case, it is likely
that wage proposals would decrease inequality in wage offers (and hence in workers earnings)
by providing a clearer (if perhaps noisy) signal of the worker’s type.
Below, we further conduct some econometric regressions to check the robustness of the
previous results on profits, efficiency and income inequality. First, Table 6 contains four RE
GLS regressions where the dependent variables are workers’ earnings (columns 1- 3) and
firms’ profits (columns 4-6). The set of independent variables are the same as in Table 5 but
now we include a dummy variable to control for treatment effects, PRIV. Notice that in

21

Note that there are several ways to compute the Gini index since we have 15 observations per subject. We compute the Gini
index as the average of the 15 periods. We believe this is the best way to capture income inequality since profits and inequality
evolves over time and the reference point should be considered within each period.
22 A remark is in order here. Even though we use proposals, we feel they work as a proxy for the disclosure of wages. In fact,
the public disclosure of proposals is weaker than the public disclosure of wages where we can expect a stronger effect. Our
main question will be to study how private and public proposals impact wage inequality (if they do).
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specifications 1 to 3 all the covariates will refer to workers’ characteristics. Thus, worker
proposals in specifications 4-6 refers to the average wage proposals made by the workers paired
with the corresponding firm. We confirm that workers’ profits are higher under proposals.
Looking at Table 6, we find that in both cases the coefficients associated with BASE are
negative and significant (-25.536 when compared to PRIV and -17.435 when compared to
PUB). Nevertheless, there are no significant differences in workers’ earnings between private
or public proposals. Thus, we find the same results as before.
Table 6: RE GLS regressions on workers’ and firms’ profits

Female
Risk lover
Self-reported
Fair-wage
High income
Worker’s
proposal
Period
BASE
PRIV
Constant
R-squared
Observations

BASE and
PRIV
(1) workers
0.309
(5.545)
-

BASE and
PUB
(2) workers
13.277**
(6.039)
-

PRIV and
PUB
(3) workers
-4.793
(6.247)

0.126***
(0.044)
-13.478**
(6.543)
-

0.106**
(0.045)
6.426
(6.183)
-

0.142**
(0.057)
-5.266
(7.211)
0.146***
(0.037)

2.605***
(0.451)
-25.536***
(5.178)
-

1.371***
(0.399)
-17.435***
(5.687)
-

2.132***
(0.456)

95.608***
(10.717)
0.317
1470

90.947***
(10.126)
0.211
1470

-

4.852
(6.542)
57.40***
(11.15)
0.272
1470

BASE and
PRIV
(4) firms
-24.826
(17.839)
9.307
(7.354)
-0.193
(0.163)
7.653
(14.583)
-

BASE and
PUB
(5) firms
-18.938
(16.646)
4.453
(8.073)
-0.204
(0.142)
15.630
(15.738)
-

PRIV and
PUB
(6) firms
-10.48
(14.52)
-0.208
(6.286)
-0.120*
(0.070)
5.597
(12.69)
-0.743***
(0.097)

1.641
(1.267)
-20.432
(16.427)
-

2.156*
(1.245)
-50.638***
(15.711)
-

3.033***
(1.018)

380.453***
(34.916)
0.149
735

08.203***
(29.833)
0.285
735

-36.61***
(14.01)
564.9***
(24.11)
0.284
735

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Looking at firm earnings ((3) to (6)) (where all covariates refer to firms’
characteristics), we find that, although they are higher under proposals, this effect is only
significant when proposals are public. That is, firms’ profits are significantly higher in PUB
than in PRIV (see coefficient of PRIV in (6)). This is also what we found with the nonparametric statistical tests. Hypothesis 3 (ii) is thus supported except that PUB and PRIV are
not significantly different, while Hypothesis 3(ii) is also partially supported with the exception
of the relationship of BASE and PRIV.
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Next, we focus on efficiency. Table 7 presents a series of RE GLS regressions where
the dependent variable is efficiency (1 if two contracts are accepted, 0.5 if only one worker
accepted the offer and, 0 when no contract is accepted). We consider an additional dummy for
the PRIV treatment. We compare PRIV and BASE in specification (1) and PUB and BASE in
specification (2). Clearly, efficiency in BASE is significantly lower than in PUB or PRIV (see
coefficient of BASE dummy in specifications (1) and (2)). However, efficiency is not
significantly different in PUB and PRIV (see coefficient of PRIV dummy in specification (3))
when controlling for other explanatory variables and exploiting all the information of the panel
data structure. Thus, Hypothesis 3 (iii) is again supported.

Table 7: RE GLS regressions on efficiency
BASE and PRIV BASE and PUB PRIV and PUB
(1)
(2)
(3)
Female
Risk lover
Self-reported fair wage
High income
Period
BASE

-0.066
(0.049)
0.003
(0.020)
0.00004
(0.0004)
0.044
(0.040)
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.096**
(0.044)

-0.049
(0.040)
-0.003
(0.020)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.040
(0.040)
0.006**
(0.003)
-0.111***
(0.04)

PRIV
Constant

R-squared
Observations

0.763***
(0.092)

0.766***
(0.072)

0.137
735

0.192
735

-0.005
(0.038)
-0.024
(0.018)
0.035
(0.030)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.006***
(0.002)

-0.039
(0.035)
0.788***
(0.051)

0.105
720

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, we turn our attention to income inequality. In Table 9, we analyse it among
workers using a RE GLS model where we consider two dependent variables. For specifications
(1) to (3), the dependent variable is the distance between each workers income in a period
minus the average incomes of all the workers in that period and treatment in absolute value
but, restricted to those cases where there was an offer and it was accepted. For specifications
(4) to (6), the dependent variable is the distance between each workers income in a period
minus the average profits of all the workers and firms in that treatment in absolute value.
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Table 9: RE GLS on the distance between workers’ earnings and average earnings of all
workers; and the distance between average earnings of all workers and firms in a treatment.

Female
High income
Self-reported
fair wage
Period
BASE

(1)
BASE and
PRIV
-8.172**
(3.837)
-1.036
(3.810)

Only workers
(2)
BASE and
PUB
-7.117**
(3.494)
0.874
(3.414)

Workers and firms
(4)
(5)
(6)
BASE and BASE and PRIV and
PRIV
PUB
PUB
-0.309
-13.280**
6.699
(5.546)
(6.039)
(6.485)
13.480**
-6.426
5.322

(3)
PRIV and
PUB
-7.366**
(3.266)
1.793
(3.719)

(6.543)

(6.183)

(7.503)

0.106**
(0.045)

-0.219***
(0.424)

0.063**
(0.031)

0.070**
(0.029)

0.152***
(0.026)

-0.126***
(0.044)

-1.254***
(0.288)
8.226**
(3.573)

-1.172***
(0.269)
11.68***
(3.222)

-0.545**
(0.266)

-2.605*** -1.371***
(0.451)
(0.399)
-43.470*** -74.110***
(5.178)
(5.687)

PRIV

1.517
(3.377)

Constant
R-squared
Observations

-2.906***
(0.272)

-25.100***
(6.817)

45.200***
(7.884)
0.125

38.39***
(7.065)
0.278

15.670***
(5.900)
0.283

540.50***
(10.72)
0.086

567.70***
(10.13)
0.200

588.60***
(11.71)
0.199

1,135

1,156

1,197

1470

1470

1440

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

First, if we focus on income inequality only amongst workers, we find that inequality
is significantly higher in BASE relative to PRIV and PUB treatments (see coefficient of the
dummy BASE in (1) and (2)). However, income inequality is not significantly different for
public or private proposals (see coefficient of the dummy PRIV in (3)). Thus, the econometric
analysis supports Hypothesis 4 (ii) partially (except for PUB and PRIV that are not significantly
different).23 When we analyze inequality in overall terms ((4) to (6)), we observe that income
inequality is significantly lower in BASE than in PUB or PRIV. This result clearly contradicts
what we found in Table 5 according to the Gini index (overall). The most plausible explanation
is that even though workers earn higher wages with proposals, this effect is dominated by the
increase in firms’ earnings due to higher acceptance rates in the presence of proposals. Finally,
when proposals are private income inequality is lower that when they are public. This is in line

23

Table C1 in Appendix C reports similar results when we measure income inequality as the proportion from the total surplus
earned by firms.
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what we found in Table 5 above. We summarize our findings in Result 3 (Hypothesis 3) and
Result 4 (Hypothesis 4) below:
Result 3.
i) Workers earn more under proposals (PUB and PRIV) relative to BASE.
ii) Relative to BASE, proposals increase firms’ profits under proposals. There are no
significant differences in proposals between PRIV and PUB
iii) Acceptance rates (and therefore efficiency) are higher under proposals. Although,
efficiency is the highest under public proposals, this is not significant when controlling
for other effects.

Result 4:
i) Workers’ share of total surplus is higher in PRIV than in PUB or BASE. Income
inequality measured through the Gini index is the highest in BASE.
ii) Income inequality among workers, conditional on the wage-offer to be accepted, is
higher in BASE than in PUB or PRIV.

5.3. Gender Analysis
Our experiment also provides some interesting results regarding gender effects that we discuss
in this section. We begin by summarizing the key papers in this literature and discuss how they
relate to our experiment. We then use these findings to provide an empirical hypothesis
regarding gender effects in our experiment. We finish by testing this hypothesis with our
experiment results.
The experimental literature on gender differences in negotiation presents mixed results.
Eckel and Grossman (2001) used the ultimatum game to study the gender gap in an
environment where participants know their partner’s gender (opposite to our setting). They
found that compared to men, women’s wage offers are higher, while, as second movers, they
are also more likely to accept wages. Solnick (2001) performs an ultimatum game experiment
with two treatments, one where the partner’s gender is known and another when it is unknown.
Similar to Eckel and Grossman’s results, he found that when gender is salient, males receive
higher offers. By contrast, there are no gender differences in wage offers when the gender of
the partner is unknown. However, in contrast to Eckel and Grossman’s findings, females were
more likely to reject offers. A possible explanation for these different results is that Solnick’s
27

experiment followed the strategy method and hence the impact of rejection decisions on the
overall outcome is less obvious.
García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) also study gender
differences in an ultimatum game. However, in their setup participants don´t know their
partner’s gender. They have three treatments and in two of them workers have to perform a
real effort task. We focus on the treatment where there is no real effort task. Though not
significant, and contrary to Eckel and Grossman (2001), they find that women offer less and
reject more they find that. As we did not inform subjects about their partner’s gender or use
the strategy method, our work is more closely related to García-Gallego, Georgantzís and
Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012). Finally, in what it is perhaps the most related experimental paper,
Rigdon (2012) uses a Demand Ultimatum Game where partner’s gender was unknown. She
finds that, when proposals are made privately, females make significantly lower wage
proposals than males and accept wage offers more frequently. However, the gender gap
disappears when proposals were made public. Note that, Rigdon’s environment is related to
our PRIV and PUB treatments. 24 Based on the findings of this literature, we state the following
empirical hypothesis:

Empirical hypothesis G: Gender
(i) Compared to males, female workers will make lower wage proposals in PRIV but
similar in PUB (Rigdon, 2012).
(ii) Compared to males, female firms will make similar wage offers in BASE (GarcíaGallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, 2012) but lower in PRIV and similar in
PUB (Rigdon 2012).
(iii) Compared to males, female workers’ acceptance rates will be similar in BASE (GarcíaGallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, 2012) but higher in PRIV and similar in
PUB (Rigdon, 2012).

Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics by gender for each treatment. Although, not
statistically significant (p = 0.415, two-tails) we observe that in line with Hypothesis G (ii),

There is also an extensive literature on gender and negotiation which is not so close to our setting either because the partner’s
gender is known or because the game is not an Ultimatum Game: Dittrich, Knabe and Leipold (2014) use a face-to-face
alternating-offers wage bargaining environment and they find that male workers receive on average higher wage offers. Also,
male workers ask higher salaries than females when they make a counteroffer to firms. Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2018),
in a real word TV negotiation game, find that when the strong bargaining position is held by men, and they bargain against
women responders, men are more likely to take a larger share of the pie. Meanwhile, women demand less from men than from
women.
24
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wage offers are 12% lower for females than males in BASE. Additionally, in line with this
hypothesis, we do not find gender differences in wage offers when proposals are present
(PRIV: 172.27 vs 169.15; PUB: 152.62 vs. 152.89) (PRIV: p = 0.634 and PUB: p = 0.655,
two-tails).25
Table 11: Descriptive statistics by gender
BASE

PRIV

PUB

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

64%

84%

86%

85%

81%

91%

Wage offers

152.39

136.33

172.27

169.15

152.62

152.89

Accepted wages
Proposals

167.17
-

155.60
-

183.63
243.45

169.96
226.71

161.10
227.41

157.58
239.85

Firms’ profits

353.17

315.11

357.56

343.53

388.54

392.76

Workers’ income

105.41

127.68

151.8

136.95

128.34

138.82

N
(firms/workers)

13/24

12/26

7/25

17/23

15/20

9/28

% Accepted offers

We do not find any differences for average wage proposals (PRIV: p = 0.353; PUB: p
= 0.347), a result that it is only partially in line with Hypothesis G (i). 26 Although not
statistically significant, it seems that, compared to men, women make lower proposals in PRIV,
but higher in PUB, a result consistent with Rigdon’s (2012) finding that women are more
assertive in wage negotiations when they have access to public information. Indeed, if we
explore the evolution over time of these variables (Figure 3), we observe that average wage
proposals by women are below those of men in every period when proposals are private (Figure
3a)), while the opposite happens when proposals are public (Figure 3b)).

Figure 3: Evolution in time of wage proposals by male and female workers
a) Private proposals

b) Public proposals

25

In fact, this result also holds if we consider data just from the first 5 periods (BASE: p = 0.211; PRIV: p =
0.949, two-tails) except for PUB where the difference is weakly significant and male started with offers slightly
higher than women (PUB: p = 0.080).
26
Again, this result also holds if we consider data just from the first 5 periods (PRIV: p = 0.279, two-tails; PUB:
p = 0.490, two-tails).
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Regarding acceptance rates, female workers accept significantly more offers than males
in BASE (p < 0.001), a result that supports Hypothesis G (iii).27 Compared to males, females
also have higher acceptance rates in PUB (p = 0.018), but similar in PRIV (p = 0.902, twotails). This is consistent with the second part of Hypothesis G (iii). Therefore, our results
support Hypothesis G (iii). Finally, we do not find significant gender differences in firm profits
or worker income except in BASE where female workers receive higher income than males, a
result that follows the female’s higher acceptance rates. 28 We summarize our findings on
gender below:
Result 5
In the absence of proposals (BASE), we find gender differences in rejection rates, workers’
profits and efficiency. With the exception of rejection rates, these differences disappear when
private (PRIV) and public (PUB) proposals are present.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have experimentally and theoretically studied the impact of pre-play
communication and information in a labour relationship. Pre-play communication is observed
in many job negotiations but their impact in wage formation is little understood. Further,
providing information on salaries has recently been explored in many countries and the
European Union29 in an attempt to make the labour markets more transparent. In our main
27

Note that García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) find that women reject more although not
significantly. We get the opposite, women reject (quantitatively) less but not significantly. A possible explanation is that
García-Gallego, Georgantzís and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez (2012) consider a fixed matching while we consider a random one.
28 For firms’ profits: p = 0.889 in BASE, p =0.427 in PRIV, p =0.612 in PUB, all tests two-tails. For workers’ profits: p =
0.038 in BASE, p =0.252 in PRIV, p =0.369 in PUB, all tests two-tails.
29
https://www.eleconomista.es/legislacion/noticias/11242527/05/21/La-ley-obligara-a-informar-del-sueldo-antes-de-laentrevista.html?fbclid=IwAR1ps57ZgHdETU8Wc146ngBAKPkfoZeEL5AkdvexzPTbJAblp1HbEyHMv4c
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treatments, workers made wage proposals that were either private or public in a subsequent
treatment. Wage proposals were non-binding and hence cheap talk. We, however, find that
simply making proposals has important implications for workers and firms.
Our results indicate that pre-play communication matters and promotes higher average
wage offers relative to the baseline without proposals. We have also shown that making
proposals public increases firm profits. As predicted by the theoretical model, both private and
public proposals lower rejection rates and hence increase efficiency relative to the baseline.
This is an important result, as it shows that non-binding pre-play communication has nontrivial welfare implications. We also explore the effects on income distribution. While workers
earn more under proposals, wage proposals decrease income inequality. In fact, workers
income is the most unequal in the baseline (without proposals). Finally, we also provide some
evidence that making a proposal, whether public or private, eliminates gender bias in
acceptance rates.
Our experiment also reveals another element of making wage proposals public. Even
though average wages increase under proposals, they increase by a greater amount when
proposals are private. Thus, we find that making worker wages public mainly benefits the firm.
This is because publicly available proposals generate a conformity effect where workers are
less likely to reject, which decreases wages relative to the case where proposals are made
privately.
The previous result is contrary to popular belief as indicated by the motivation behind
some policy measures that have been recently gaining increased attraction. These relate to wage
disclosure policies in organizations to address income inequality with emphasis on fair
remuneration30 or wage disclosure for the sake of transparency (a la California, Switzerland,
Norway or Denmark) 31. For example, the UK (since January 1, 2019) has a pay disclosure
policy where its biggest companies have to disclose and explain every year their top bosses
pay and the gap between that and their average worker. Similar measures have also been
30

https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/strategy/reward/pay-fairness-reporting-factsheet
See for example, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-executive-pay-transparency-measures-come-into-force,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/11/21/the-growing-movement-to-make-employees-salaries-public-for-all-tosee/?sh=68cb40a97bb8,https://time.com/5353848/salary-pay-transparency-work/and
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/19/magazine/salary-sharing.html.
31
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adopted in several countries such as Norway, Sweden, Finland and states in US32. Further,
recently the EU commission has presented a proposal as regards wage transparency that aims
to guarantee the same wages for the same work and to address gender discrimination. We find
that while the use of public proposals eliminates many gender differences, making information
public for proposals works to the benefit of the firms.
Our paper is a first step in trying to understand the complicated interaction between
public and private information in labour markets and its subsequent impact on worker wages,
firm profits and overall efficiency. While inequality in salaries in the workplace is a growing
policy concern, it is, however, not clear its wider implications towards work performance and
well-being will be. It remains as an open question what the effect of wage proposals in the
labor market will be when effort levels are considered.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A1: Instructions for PRIV treatment33
General instructions
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions
carefully. Depending upon the decisions you make you can earn additional money in addition
to the 3 Euros fee for your participation. It is extremely important that you read the instructions
carefully.
Absolutely no communication whatsoever is allowed in the course of the experiment.
Please address questions you might have to us directly. Any violation of this will lead to
the exclusion from both the experiment and all payments.
This experiment consists of companies and employees. Each individual will be assigned
randomly the role of a company, or employee, and will maintain the same role during the entire
experiment.
The entire experiment comprises of 15 periods. In each period, each company will be randomly
matched with two employees.
The identity of the employees will not be disclosed to any company before or after the
experiment. Likewise, employees will not know with which firm they have been paired or the
identity of other employees who are assigned to the same company as them.

Decisions in each period
At the beginning of each period, the company will receive a salary proposal from her two
potential employees. The salary proposal is not binding, that is, companies can decide whether
to make the proposed offer, another offer or no offer. The proposals will be private, that is,
each employee will only know his proposal (not the one of the other employee).
After learning the salary proposals, the company can submit a salary offer separately to one,
or both, employees, or submit no offer at all. Each offer received by an employee is known
only to them.
Once an employee learns the salary offer and its amount, they will have to decide whether to
accept or reject it. Employees will never know whether the company they are paired with
has submitted an offer to the other employee.
Employees learn only the amount of their own salary offer. They don’t know if the company
submitted any other salary offers. If, for instance, a company submits a salary offer to one
employee and a different one to the other employee, none of the employees will learn the other
employee’s offer.
33

Instructions for other treatments are available upon request.
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The company’s income in each period
When an offer is accepted, the employee and the company close a contract. This will generate
the following income for the company:
 If the company concludes a contract with the two employees, she will achieve an income
of 780 points - salary offered to employee 1 - salary offered to employee 2.
 If the company concludes a contract with one employee, she will achieve an income of 390
points - the salary offered to the employee who accepted the offer.


If the company concludes no contract at all (because she has not made an offer or because
her offers has not been accepted), she will achieve an income of zero points.
The employee’s income in each period



If no offer of salary is submitted to you, your income amounts to zero.



If you accept the salary offer, your income will be the amount of the salary offered.



If you reject the salary offer, your income will be zero.

EXAMPLES of how income is calculated in a period
1. The employee 1 makes a salary proposal of 70 points and employee 2 of 150 points.
The company submits two salary offers, 120 points to employee 1 and 120 points to
employee 2. Both reject the offer:
-Income for the company: 0
-Income for the employees: 0
2. The employee 1 makes a salary proposal of 250 points and employee 2 of 100 points.
The company submits two salary offers to the two employees, 80 points to employee 1 and
200 to employee 2. If both accept the offer:
-Income for the company: 780-80-200 = 500
-Income for employee 1: 80
-Income for employee 2: 200
3. The employee 1 makes a salary proposal of 65 points and employee 2 of 220 points.
The company submits a salary offer to employee 1 of 180 points. If employee 1 accepts
the offer:
-Income for the company: 390-180 = 210
-Income for employee 1: 180
38

-Income for employee 2: 0

Please note:
 The salary you offer to be paid to the employee only if the offer is actually accepted.
 The above mentioned rules apply to all companies and all employees. They are known to
each company and to each employee.

How to make your decision
All decisions will be made on the screen. At the beginning of each period, you will be shown
the following screen for companies:

On this screen, the company will have to decide whether to submit a salary offer to each
employee. To do so, the company must click either “Yes” or “No” in the respective input fields.
If the company clicks “Yes” for a particular employee, then she will be asked to enter the
amount of the salary offer she wants to make to that particular employee.
If the company clicks “No”, that particular employee will not get a salary offer.
The permitted numbers for salary offers are between 0 and 390:
0  salary offer  390
Once the company has made her decision(s) and entered the input, she must click the OK
button. Important, the company can revise her decisions as long as the OK button is not
activated.
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To finish this stage, the company must click on the “NEXT” button (on the right bottom
corner).

The following screen shows the decision that the employee will have to make in the event that
they have received a salary offer:

On this screen, the employee will be informed of the exact amount of the offer. Afterwards,
the employee must decide whether to accept or reject the offer by clicking on "accept" or
"reject".
If the employee has not received an offer, the message "The company has decided not to make
any offer to you in this period" will appear.
The income for that period will then appear on the screen.
This concludes the period. In the following period, each company will be randomly
assigned two new employees. At the end of each period, the company will be able to see the
salary offers of each employee and the income of the previous periods. Employees will see the
offers received (only their own) and their income from previous periods.
Before starting the experiment, we will tell you on the computer screen the equivalence
between points and Euros.
You will only be paid the points corresponding to a randomly chosen round by rolling a die.
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Appendix A2: Control Questions for PRIV and PUB treatments34
It is mandatory to answer every question. Wrong answers have no consequences. Address any
questions to us!
1.

Employee 1 makes a wage proposal of 100 points and employee 2 of 120. The company
does not make wage offers to any of the employees. What is the income in points for,



The company: 0



Each of the employees: 0

2.

Employee 1 makes a wage proposal of 80 points and employee 2 of 120. The company
sends wage offers to employee 1 and 2 for a value of 250 points. What is the income
in points for,

(a) Both employees accept the offer. What is the income in points for,


The company: 280



Each of the employees: 250

(b) Employee 1 accepts the offer and 2 rejects it. What is the income in points for,


The company:140



Employee 2: 0

3. Employee 1 makes a wage proposal of 30 points and employee 2 of 70. The company
sends a wage offer for a value of 30 pints to employee 1 and a wage offer of 60 points to
employee 2. What is the income in points if,
(a) Both employees accept the offer. What is the income in points for,


The company: 690



Each of the employees: 60

(b) Employee 1 accepts the offer and 2 rejects it. What is the income in points for,

34

Control questions for Baseline are available upon request.
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The company:360



Employee 1: 30

(c) Both employees reject the offer. What is the income in points for,


The company: 0



Each of the employees: 0

Appendix A3: Post-questionnaire
In this questionnaire we ask you to give us some general information about yourself. After
carefully reading each section, we ask you to answer by writing an "x" in the appropriate box.
Please, answer all the questions.
Thank you for participating!

General information:
1. Date of birth:
2. Gender: a) Male: ☐

b) Female: ☐

3. School and Degree that you study at the university:
School:……………
Degree:……………
4. What is the zip code of your parents' house?

5 . If Juan can drink a barrel of water in 6 days and Maria can drink a barrel in 12 days, how
long do they need to drink a barrel between the two of them?

6. Juan receives the fifteenth highest grade in his class and at the same time the fifteenth lowest
grade in his class. How many students are there in class?

7. A man buys a pig for € 60, sells it for € 70, buys it again for € 80, and finally sells it for €
90. How much money has he made?
8. Simon decides to invest € 8,000 in shares one day at the beginning of 2018. Six months after
investing, on July 17, the shares he bought decrease in value by 50%. Fortunately, from July
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17 to October 17, the shares you have purchased increase in value by 75%. At this moment,
Simon
a. did not win or lose anything in the stocks market,
b. his shares have a higher value tan when he started,
c. he lost money (his shares lost value)

9. Imagine that you are participating in a program in which you have to decide how many boxes
to open out of a total of 100 numbered boxes. All boxes contain € 10 except one that has € 0.
You do not know where the box with no money is, only that it can be in any of the 100 boxes
with the same probability. The boxes are opened in numerical order. If, for example, you decide
to open 20 boxes, the boxes ranging from 1 to 20 will be opened; If, for example, you decide
to open 57, all the boxes between 1 and 57 will be collected.
How many boxes would you decide to open in this situation?

10.- What do you think is the appropriate salary for a worker? (Remind that it must be a number
between 0 and 390):

11.- If you have participated in the experiment as a company and you have chosen different
salaries for your two workers in the same period, why have you done it? (If you have not been
a company, please write "I am a worker").

12.- If you have participated in the experiment as a worker, what is the minimum wage you
would be willing to accept? (If you have not been a worker, please write “I am a company”).

13.- Do you think it is difficult for you to recognize your mistakes?
Yes
No
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Appendix B: Theory Proofs
𝐿 )𝑞
Proof of Proposition 1: The firm’s optimal decision is to offer the low wage if (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
≥
𝐻
𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
; otherwise, she will offer the high wage. Thus, 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = {

𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 ≥ 𝑇
. The rest
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 < 𝑇

of the Proposition follows immediately from this.
∎
Proof of Proposition 2: Applying Bayes rule we can compute the firm’s belief that the worker
is low type given the prior (𝑞) and the observation that his proposal was high:

𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 ≔ 𝑃(𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) =

𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚,𝐿 )
𝑞
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 )

where 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) = (1 − 𝜆) and 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) = 1 − 𝑞𝜆
Therefore, when observing a high proposal, the firm’s optimal decision is to offer a low wage
𝐿 )𝑞 𝑃𝑅𝐼
𝐻
if (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
̂
≥ 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
; otherwise, she will offer a high wage. Thus, if we denote by

𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 to be the optimal wage when observing a high proposal, we get 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 =
{

𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 ≥ 𝑇
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 < 𝑇

And because the firm always matches the proposal of the low type (which is fully revealing),
the optimal firm’s policy is:

𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = {

𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿
𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻

The rest of the proposition follows immediately from this.
∎

Proof of Corollary 1: First note that 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 < 𝑞 and hence, when comparing PRI and BASE
there are three possible cases:
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𝑇 ≤ 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼

(i)

In this case, 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 which means that, regardless of proposals, wage offers
are the same in both cases, 𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 , and this leads to the same firms profits
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑃𝑅𝐼
Π𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼 = Π𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 ; workers income Π𝑊
= Π𝑊
and acceptance rates 𝑟 𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑟 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑞.

𝑇>𝑞

(ii)

In this case, 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 . Therefore, expected firm’s profits are:
Π𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑞𝜆(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) + (1 − 𝑞𝜆)(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) = 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 )
> Π𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻
Expected worker’s incomes are:
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑃𝑅𝐼
Π𝑊
= 𝑞𝜆𝑤𝑚,𝐿 + (1 − 𝑞𝜆)𝑤𝑚,𝐻 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) > Π𝑊
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐻

And acceptance rates are: 𝑟 𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑟 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 1
𝑇 ∈ (𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 , 𝑞]

(iii)

In this case, 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 > 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 . Therefore, firm’s profits in PRI are (see case ii):
Π𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 + 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) while expected firm’s profits in BASE are: Π𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 =
𝑞(𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) where Π𝐹𝑃𝑅𝐼 > Π𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 iff 𝑀(1 − 𝑞) > 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 (1 − 𝑞𝜆) − 𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (1 − 𝜆) . Note
that for this condition not to hold 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 should be relatively close to 𝑀 (i.e., 𝑀 sufficiently low)
in which case 𝑇 > 𝑞 and hence condition (iii) would not hold.
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
𝑃𝑅𝐼
Expected worker’s incomes are: Π𝑊
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑞𝜆(𝑤𝑚,𝐻 − 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) > Π𝑊
= 𝑞𝑤𝑚,𝐿

And acceptance rate are: 𝑟 𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 1 > 𝑞 = 𝑟 𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸
Proof of Proposition 3: Applying Bayes rule we can compute the firm’s belief that the worker
is low type given the prior (𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ), and the observation that his proposal was high:

𝑞̂

𝑃𝑈𝐵

≔

𝑃𝑈𝐵
𝑃(𝑤𝑚

𝑃𝑈𝐵
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) 𝑃𝑈𝐵
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 |𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) =
𝑞
𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 )
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𝑃𝑈𝐵
where 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 |𝑤𝑚
= 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 ) = (1 − 𝜆𝑞) and 𝑃(𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 ) = 1 − 𝜆𝑞𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 .

Therefore, when observing a high proposal, the firm’s optimal decision is to offer a low wage
𝐿 )𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵
𝐻
if (𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
̂
≥ 𝑀 − 𝑤𝑚
; otherwise, she will offer a high wage. Thus, if we denote by

𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 to be the optimal wage when observing a high proposal, we get 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 =
𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≥ 𝑇
{
𝑤𝑚,𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 < 𝑇
And because the firm always matches the proposal of the low type (which is fully revealing),
the optimal firm’s policy is:

𝑤𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 = {

𝑤𝑚,𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿
𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻

The rest of the proposition follows immediately from this.
∎
Proof of Corollary 2: First note that 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 because 𝑞 𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞. Moreover, 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞
and 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 < 𝑞. Therefore, 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 > 𝑞 > 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 . From Propositions 1-3, we know that if 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑈𝐵 >
𝑞 > 𝑇 > 𝑞̂ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 , then 𝑤𝑜𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (Proposition 1); 𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑅𝐼 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐻 (Proposition 2) and
𝑤
̃𝑜𝑃𝑈𝐵 = 𝑤𝑚,𝐿 (Proposition 3). The rest of the Corollary follows immediately from these
optimal wage offers.
∎
Proof of Corollary 3: It follows immediately from Corollary 2 and the arguments in the text.
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